Introduction
Do the claims made by indigenous peoples today pose a fundamental challenge to liberal ideals of distributive justice and political community? In the growing literature on indigenous peoples' rights and political theory, very often the kinds of concerns that are expressed have to do with whether existing political arrangements either oppress or dominate indigenous peoples, or the extent to which indigenous peoples' claims and ways of life are incompatible with liberal norms of justice or citizenship.
1 So the tendency is often to see them as posing a problem for liberal democratic societies; as undermining civic unity or universal norms of justice, or challenging the legitimacy of the state and its institutions due to a legacy of historical injustice. In debates over cosmopolitanism and the morality of nationalism, indigenous peoples tend to be located very much on the nationalist and moral particularist side of the fence. The prominent use of nationalist discourse by indigenous peoples themselves encourages this presumption, but it goes deeper than that. Demands for self-determination and self-government in order to secure cultural integrity and exercise jurisdiction over territory are indeed often what nations seek. And indigenous difference -cultural, political, historical, and moral -is often singled out to distinguish them from other groups. If our understanding of justice is inescapably local in various ways, then such differences might, it could be argued, severely constrain the content of any principles of global justice (Miller, 2000: 90-4) . And thus Jeremy Waldron has argued recently that the whole notion of 'indigenous rights' is deeply anti-cosmopolitan, just insofar as it seeks to tie entitlements to land or selfgovernment to membership of an ethnic group and its historical occupation of a territory, over and above the general needs and entitlements of others (Waldron, 2003) .
In this chapter I want to take a slightly different approach to these questions. Instead of replaying the conflict between nationalism and cosmopolitanism, or between moral particularism and universalism, I want to ask: What possibilities do the demands of indigenous peoples offer for thinking differently about global or transnational justice, and about the nature of international law? In particular, what presuppositions do they challenge that tend to frame the 'problem' of indigenous peoples and global justice in the first place? One thing they clearly do is throw into relief the state-centric focus of much liberal thinking about justice and citizenship, whether communitarian, Rawlsian or some combination thereof. And this provides a way into thinking about the nature of global justice and cosmopolitanism more generally. One of the basic questions for theorists of global justice is: What are the ultimate units of moral concern; states, 'peoples', societies, cultures or persons? Considering the situation of indigenous peoples in the international system offers a slightly different perspective on this fundamental question, or so I hope to show. Their demand to be treated as political entities with some form of international standing beyond internal forms of self-determination, clearly challenges presumptions about who counts, morally speaking, in the international (and supranational) sphere. It certainly challenges the dominant role of states. And the history of their treatment within states and the international system raises difficult questions about the relation between global justice and historical injustice, something often ignored in the globalization literature.
What do I mean by 'emergent' cosmopolitanism? A property is emergent insofar as it arises out of some lower-level properties in place, but isn't merely those lower-level ones differently described. What I want to suggest is that the struggle to accommodate and shape international norms and laws to meet indigenous peoples' demands provides intimations of transnational modes of political community that are neither a form of 'explanatory nationalism' or 'explanatory cosmopolitanism' (or 'explanatory realism,' for that matter).
2 They point beyond the nation-state and exclusively interstate-made law, but not necessarily to the structure of a global political community derived from freestanding universal moral principles. Instead, their demand for justification of their exclusion from existing international norms and principles points to the way historical injustice and difference can structure our moral concepts, and presents deep challenges to the justificatory ambitions of liberal theories of global justice. And yet their demand for justification in itself, combined with their re-interpretation and application of these norms in new ways, points to a practice of seeking more just relations between them and existing states and international institutions which is pluralist but not state-centric, immanent but also universalist.
Cosmopolitanisms
If cosmopolitanism is an attitude or sentiment compatible with various kinds of political arrangements, then what is the essence of this attitude? There are two general components. First, a commitment to the equal worth
